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ARTICLES





During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, judicial selection generated con-
siderable controversy. In the two-year period immediately prior to the 1988
presidential election, judicial selection actually became, at times, the pre-
dominant public issue. The significant opposition to the elevation of William
Rehnquist to Chief Justice' gave way to more contentious battles over Rob-
ert Bork and other lesser known appellate and district court nominations. In
their discussion of these events, commentators have demonstrated a partisan
defense of one side or another.2 Writers sympathetic to the former President
bemoan the "politicization" of the selection process; those opposed rejoice in
the voice of the people being heard.3
The judicial selection process, however, should not be evaluated in only
partisan terms. Beneath the straightforward political struggle lies disagree-
ment over the respective institutional roles of the President and the Senate in
the judicial appointment process. An even more profound tension exists
* Copyright © 1990 by Douglas W. Kmiec
** Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice, 1988-89. The views expressed by the
author are not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
1. Rehnquist was confirmed by a vote of 65 to 33, which Professor Herman Schwartz
claimed was "the largest vote against a chief justice in history .... " H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING
THE COURTS 117 (1988).
2. Compare THE JUDGES WAR: THE SENATE, LEGAL CULTURE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
AND JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION (P. McGuigan & J. O'Connell eds. 1987) (conservative view)
with H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1 (liberal view).
3. Compare Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REv. 672,
687 (1989) (expressing the concern that if the searching inquiry of the Bork confirmation be-
comes the norm, "the confirmation process will become a political battleground") with
Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public.- To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1213 (1988) (praising the Senate's actions as a surrogate for popular participation in the
appointment process).
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concerning whether, and if so when, law may be appropriately interpreted
and applied in light of moral considerations.
This Article examines the judicial selection process during the Reagan
years. The Article begins with a brief outline of the characteristics of those
selected and the manner of their selection. Next, the Article considers the
respective roles of the President and the Senate and concludes that both may
properly inquire into a judicial candidate's fitness and philosophy. Finally,
the Article examines judicial selection under President Reagan from a juris-
prudential perspective to explore what those selections may reveal about the
relationship between law and morality and the nature of the source of the
obligation to obey the law. The Article demonstrates that this relationship
remains unsettled even within camps of political foes and allies of particular
nominees.
I. THE NATURE AND METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTIONS
President Ronald Reagan appointed 404 judges.4 Four of the appoint-
ments, including the elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice, were to
the Supreme Court, 83 to the courts of appeals, 292 to district court benches,
6 to the Court of International Trade, and 19 to the Claims Court.5 These
appointments represent approximately fifty percent of the federal judiciary.
This percentage, however, was not extraordinarily high. For example, in a
tenure half as long, President Carter made appointments representing almost
forty percent of the judiciary. 6
In terms of life experience, the average age of Reagan appointees was
forty-nine years, just slightly younger than the average of fifty years for the
judges chosen by President Carter.7 Of course, no objective measure of qual-
ity exists. However, using the American Bar Association (ABA) ratings, a
study in Judicature found that "the Reagan appointments may be seen as
equaling the Carter appointees in quality and marginally surpassing the ap-
pointments of Ford, Nixon, and Johnson."8
4. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MYTHS AND REALITIES -
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL SELECTION 6 (1,988) [hereinafter MYTHS AND REALI-
TIES] (much of the factual information in this section of the Article is derived from this widely
circulated, but unpublished report).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 7.
7. Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70
JUDICATURE 324, 328, 331 (1987).
8. Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE
313, 322 (1985). Professor Goldman found Reagan's second term appointments even better,
surpassing those from the first term and constituting "the most professionally qualified group
of appointees over the past two decades." Goldman, supra note 7, at 329.
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The selection process during the Reagan years began with an initial bat-
tery of interviews conducted by upwards of ten senior officials at the Depart-
ment of Justice (Department). Sometimes a dozen or more candidates
would be recommended to the Department by various sources: members of
Congress, who frequently had their own merit panels; Department officials,
who determined on the basis of a person's prior service on the bench, prac-
tice, or scholarly writing that such individual shared the President's judicial
philosophy; or local colleagues and associates of the prospective candidate.
Interviewers at the Department commonly evaluated a candidate's ability
by asking the aspirant to think through hypothetical legal problems of some
complexity. They also made an effort to evaluate a candidate's demeanor
and assess his or her commitment to impartiality and fairness. The Depart-
ment summarized the information collected during the interviews as well as
the results of preliminary reference checks and subsequently discussed the
results with the Counsel to the President and the Attorney General.
The emerging consensus candidate was thereafter subjected to a full-field
FBI investigation and an evaluation by the ABA screening committee. The
ABA committee interviewed the candidate and members of the bench and
bar familiar with his or her work. Assuming both investigations were
favorable, the Attorney General presented the candidate to the President for
his consideration. If the President approved of the candidate, he would for-
mally announce and forward the nomination to the Senate for review by the
Judiciary Committee, and ultimately, for consideration by the entire Senate.
The men and women selected by President Reagan using this selection
process were, by and large, successfully confirmed. The Senate, however,
did not confirm three candidates - one each at the Supreme Court, appel-
late, and district court levels.9 An additional number of candidates were
nominated, but did not receive the full attention of the Judiciary Commit-
tee"° or withdrew in the face of controversy or unfavorable background in-
formation." Yet, the relative few who were turned away, or discouraged,
9. The candidates were Robert Bork, Bernard Siegan, and Jefferson Sessions, respec-
tively. H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 96, 140, 149 n.66.
10. Most prominent, perhaps, was Judith Richards Hope,.a respected lawyer who had
been nominated for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. When
the 100th Congress adjourned sine die, it had not acted upon seventeen Reagan nominees.
These candidates would have required renomination by President Bush in the next Congress to
be considered further. To date, most of these neglected candidates have not been renominated.
11. The best known case of withdrawal prior to nomination, but after White House an-
nouncement, was that of Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg. Judge Ginsburg withdrew from consid-
eration for the United States Supreme Court after published reports stated that he, at one time,
used marijuana prior to his federal service. Professor Schwartz lists William Harvey, Michael
Horowitz, Marion Harrison, and Lino Graglia as also withdrawing either before or after for-
mal nomination. H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 97-98.
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were the subject of disproportionate debate and controversy in the course of
their consideration. The dispute over the respective roles of the President
and Senate in the selection process created a considerable element of this
controversy. 12
II. THE ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SENATE
A. An Historical Perspective
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he President...
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law. . .. " 3 These words did not come easily
to the convention delegates in 1787.14 Some delegates, notably James Wil-
son of Pennsylvania, advocated that the President should have complete au-
thority to appoint judges without the Senate's acquiesence. 5 Wilson feared
that a collective body was incapable of the partisan-free deliberation neces-
sary to select judges of ability and competence. 16 By contrast, South Caro-
lina's John Rutledge, who was later nominated as Chief Justice by George
Washington, believed that exclusive power in the President would be monar-
chial. 7 Perhaps Mr. Rutledge had second thoughts when the Senate subse-
quently rejected his nomination. Whether Rutledge did or not, the drafters
of the Constitution ultimately decided to make the President's appointment
authority conditional.
Of course, the President's discretion to nominate, as distinguished from
his authority to appoint, is unfettered. If there are constraints upon whom
may be nominated, or on what the President may inquire of a prospective
nominee, they are political or prudential, not constitutional. Alexander
Hamilton explained that:
12. For an annotated bibliography on this subject, see Slinger, Payne & Gates, The Senate
Power of Advice and Consent on Judicial Appointments: An Annotated Research Bibliography,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 106 (1989).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
14. For a brief, but thoughtful, summary of the constitutional history, see Ginsburg, Con-
firming Supreme Court Justices: Thoughts on the Second Opinion Rendered by the Senate, 1988
U. ILL. L. REV. 101, 103-05.
15. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (M. Farrand
rev. ed. 1966).
16. Id. By contrast, Roger Sherman was more confident in the role of the Senate, noting
that the body "would be composed of men nearly equal to the Executive, and would of course
have on the whole more wisdom." J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, at 316 (1966) (quoting Sherman). Apparently, Sherman believed wisdom is
cumulative.
17. J. MADISON, supra note 16, at 67.
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[i]n the act of nomination [the President's] judgment alone would
be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man,
who with the approbation of the Senate should fill an office....
There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the part of the
Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige
him to make another; but they cannot themselves choose - they
can only ratify or reject the choice he may have made. '8
The historical record suggests that the Framers may have anticipated that
the Senate would rarely deny appointments.1 9 Thus, some have argued that
the Senate cannot use judicial philosophy as the basis for withholding con-
sent.2" But what individual Framers may have expected, and what they ac-
tually provided, are not necessarily the same. The plain text of the
Constitution does not limit the Senate's role to merely the ascertainment of
intellectual competence or judicial temperament. Even if the Constitution
contains limits, scholars presently argue with some force that the seven-
teenth amendment, which establishes a more democratic means of Senate
selection, and other contemporary developments, now favor a more expan-
sive inquiry by the Senate.2
One may have expected, however, a clearer, more settled conception of
the Senate's role long before the Reagan administration. Curiously, that was
not so. Perhaps the seedlings of doubt regarding the Senate's role took root
because, for most appellate and district court nominations, the Senate found
it unnecessary to assert its prerogative to block nominees.22 The men and
women appointed by past presidents to these courts have been, with rare
exception, competent professionals with little in their backgrounds to gener-
ate objection. Moreover, even when some element of controversy existed,
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 456-57 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
19. Hamilton conceived of the Senate's role as "an excellent check upon a spirit of favorit-
ism in the President" precluding "the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice,
from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity." Id. at 457.
But cf Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1988) (suggesting that
this passage reveals that the Framers "contemplated the Senate's role as a significant check on
presidential discretion"). I disagree with Professor Carter's speculation that this is what the
Framers "contemplated" as a matter of practice primarily because the clear emphasis of the
passage is on the avoidance of cronyism; the passage says very little about the Senate's ability
to inquire into philosophy. What the Framers guessed would happen, however, is not disposi-
tive in light of what the Senate is permitted to do under a fair reading of the Constitution.
20. Fein, supra note 3, at 687. See also Lee, Only the President May Rightfully Consider a
Justice's Ideology, 99 L.A. Daily J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 4, col. 3.
21. See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 132 (1985). Professor Tribe ar-
gues that in modern times greater emphasis is placed on diversity and democracy. He supports
this proposition by pointing out that although the Framers believed that elite bodies would
select the President and the Senate, these beliefs either never materialized or were the subject
of amendment.
22. See generally J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE (1953).
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senatorial courtesy often resulted in a prescreening of candidates that shel-
tered disagreement between the executive and the legislature from the public
eye.
23
Political memories are also short. Consequently, the Senate's role might
have appeared passive and open to question because few contemporary op-
portunities existed to consider the role with respect to Supreme Court nomi-
nations. Prior to President Reagan's nominees, Justice John Paul Stevens
was the only justice named to the Court for almost a decade. President
Carter's single term provided no opportunity to appoint anyone to the
Court. In addition, President Reagan's decision to break the gender barrier
with the nomination of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was so loudly ap-
plauded that those few concerned with her abortion views and prior experi-
ence were barely audible.2 4
Yet, this senatorial quiescence cannot obscure the fact that since the time
of the Constitution's inception, the Senate has not hesitated to raise objec-
tions and deny appointments when it deemed such action necessary. The
Senate rejected Washington's nominee, Rutledge, due to his opposition to
the Jay Treaty." In addition, the Senate initially denied Roger Taney a seat
because of his opposition to the national bank.26 Judge George Woodward's
"Nativist" or anti-ethnic agenda could not withstand the glare of public
scrutiny in the mid-nineteenth century.2 7 Others became mere historical
23. See, e.g., K. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-61 (1979); J. HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUITS (1981); J. SCHMIDHAUSER, JUDGES AND JUSTICES: THE FEDERAL AP-
PELLATE JUDICIARY (1979).
24. H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 63. Professor Schwartz observed that "[because
O'Connor was the first female nominated to the Court, many liberals and feminists promptly
supported her. Her only substantial opposition came from anti-abortion groups, who, seeing
that she had supported liberalized abortion when she was in the Arizona Senate in 1970 and
1974, thought she was prochoice." Id.
25. See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 73 (2d ed. 1985). Justice Rutledge had previously served on
and resigned from the Court to accept the Chief Justiceship of the South Carolina Supreme
Court. Id. Rutledge apparently disliked the rigors of the circuit riding that was then part of
the Justices' job. Id. Professor Tribe relates that Oliver Ellsworth led the opposition against
Rutledge. "Ellsworth has been called the Father of the Federal Judiciary because he spon-
sored the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established a system of lower federal courts and set the
size of the Supreme Court." L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 79.
26. Abraham, A Bench Happily Filled: Some Historical Reflections on the Supreme Court
Appointment Process, 66 JUDICATURE 282, 290-92 (1983). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at
57.
27. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 87.
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footnotes because they supported slavery28 or were antiunion. 29 Still others
were rejected for lack of ability.3 ° In all, the Senate has rejected almost one
in four nominees to the Supreme Court.31
It requires a certain historical forgetfulness, then, to conclude that the
Senate has acted beyond its constitutional prerogatives in the Reagan years.
The Reagan administration may have preferred a more agreeable Senate,
especially after the Senate fell to the Democrats in 1986. Nevertheless, it is
simply error, if not ahistorical and implicitly anti-democratic, to insist that
the Senate circumscribe its investigation to "determining whether the nomi-
nee was intellectually competent and whether his nomination was tainted by
cronyism, corruption, or crass political partisanship."'3 2 As Professor Louis
Henkin observed: "In an appointment to the United States Supreme Court,
the Senate comes second, but is not secondary. The standards the Senate
should apply are the same as those that should govern the President: what
would serve the national interest." 33
B. President Reagan's Judicial Policy Animates the Senate
In retrospect, several features of President Reagan's judicial selection ap-
proach were likely to, and did, evoke more active attention from the Senate.
First, beginning with the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan made judicial se-
lection a cornerstone of his political vision for the nation. The 1980 Repub-
lican platform included a pledge to appoint:
28. 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 320-57 (rev. ed.
1926). After Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), it became essential for a Supreme
Court nominee to establish antislavery credentials. Id.
29. Professor Tribe reports that the labor movement opposed John Parker, a nominee of
President Hoover, for his prior opinion on the Fourth Circuit upholding "yellow dog" con-
tracts, that is, those contracts requiring a pledge never to join a union. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 21, at 90.
30. H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 48. In considering the ultimately unsuccessful Nixon
nomination of.G. Harold Carswell, Senator Roman Hruska countered concerns about Mr.
Carswell's legal competence by stating: "Even if he was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre
judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a
little chance? We can't have all Brandeises and Cardozos and Frankfurters and stuff like that
there." Id. (quoting Senator Hruska).
31. See Abraham, supra note 26, at 282. Since the publication of the Abraham article, the
Senate rejected Robert Bork and confirmed Anthony Kennedy. The President announced an
intent to nominate Douglas Ginsburg to the Supreme Court, but Judge Ginsburg withdrew
before he could be nominated because of certain questions pertaining to his personal behavior,
practice experience, and possible ethical conflicts. Ginsburg Withdraws Name As Supreme
Court Nominee, Citing Marijuana "Clamor," N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, pt. 1, at A1, col. 6.
32. Fein, supra note 3, at 687 (advocating a circumscribed senatorial role).
33. Henkin, "Ideology" Is a Central Consideration, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1987, at A3 1,
col. 2.
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[W]omen and men ... whose judicial philosophy is... consistent
with the belief in the decentralization of the federal government
and efforts to return decisionmaking power to state and local
elected officials ... who respect traditional family values and the
sanctity of innocent human life.34
This statement unmistakably promised that President Reagan would scruti-
nize a judicial candidate's political or judicial philosophy. Not surprisingly,
such philosophical screening invited the Senate to question whether someone
with deeply held moral and political views could impartially apply the law
when the law contradicted those values. More on this later,35 but for now
suffice it to observe that from its pre-sovereign moments, the Reagan admin-
istration stated, unequivocally, that judicial philosophy mattered. The Sen-
ate merely responded in kind.
The diminution of senatorial courtesy or patronage also may have spurred
a more intense and visible Senate interest. While members of Congress, es-
pecially those within the President's party, continued to have significant in-
put with respect to district court nominees, this influence on appointments at
the appellate and Supreme Court levels noticeably decreased. The White
House and the Department of Justice stepped in to fill the gap and, as a
consequence, a more uniform and centralized decisionmaking entity devel-
oped. The Department of Justice placed judicial selection within the Office
of Legal Policy,36 thereby further accentuating the importance assigned to
policy considerations in the selection process. This factor interacted with
and highlighted the President's personal emphasis on judicial philosophy.
As a result of the combination of centralization and Reagan's emphasis on
philosophy, the Senate was even more likely to intensify its inquiry of judi-
cial nominees.
This description of the increased importance of policy considerations
should not be misunderstood as criticism. As already indicated, there is
nothing illicit about the President or the Senate inquiring into judicial phi-
losophy.37 The regrettable characterization of such inquiries as a "litmus
test" is dismissed fairly as a red herring. To be sure, if either the President
or the Senate reject candidates based on a few "yes" or "no" answers or
34. 1980 Republican Platform, reprinted in 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2030, 2046
(1980).
35. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
36. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh abolished this office in the spring of 1989.
37. Professor Schwartz asserts that President Reagan's ideolbgical screening was the most
pronounced since John Adams' midnight attempt to pack the courts with sympathetic federal-
ists before leaving office. H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 55. Whether one finds his assertion
true is more than likely determined by one's political outlook. The fact that presidents have
made these inquiries since the time of the nation's founding seems the more noteworthy point.
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slogans, the procedure would have been properly open to criticism. Little in
the record, however, supports chastising the President or the Senate on this
score. 38 What sloganeering did occur was orchestrated largely outside the
formal selection process.39
With the decisionmaking process centralized, a third factor prompted
Senate scrutiny: the Reagan administration's proclivity to choose candidates
who have compiled substantial written records, either as sitting judges, aca-
demics, or both.' This facilitated the President's review of a candidate's
beliefs, and it quite naturally became an important part of the confirmation
inquiry. While the presence of a written record did complicate and lengthen
the review process, it had two salutary effects. It brought to the bench at the
appellate level both legal academics, who brought with them the type of
comprehensive thinking about the law that teaching inspires,41 and state and
federal trial judges, whose practical experience is invaluable to the compe-
tent administration of the courts.
C. The De-emphasis of the Role of the American Bar Association in
Judicial Candidate Selection
The centralized selection process employed in the Reagan era had an addi-
tional feature: a slightly reduced role for the American Bar Association
(ABA). The ABA became involved in judicial selection perhaps more re-
cently than commonly thought. Not until the Eisenhower administration
did any administration give substantial weight to the recommendation of
ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary or permit the ABA to
38. "[T]here is no objective evidence that a 'litmus test' in terms of specific policy views
ha[d] been employed [by the Reagan administration] to accept or reject candidates."
Goldman, supra note 7, at 326.
Regrettably, no process works perfectly. Apparently some nominees had their beliefs mis-
characterized or were opposed for specious reasons. See Lacovara, The Wrong Way to Pick
Judges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, at A31, col. 1 (past organizational involvement overshad-
owing obvious agreement with President's judicial philosophy and an apparently commendable
record of public service). Experience suggests that those with multifaceted intellectual inter-
ests that are difficult to label in a "political" sense run this hazard more than others.
39. See generally D. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 101 (1988) (reporting on the millions of
dollars spent in the course of the Bork confirmation contest); Rotunda, The Confirmation Pro-
cess for Supreme Court Justices in the Modern Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559 (1988)(discussing the
battle surrounding Judge Bork's confirmation hearings and the resulting media campaign
against him).
40. For a comment favorable to this practice because of the shortcomings of oral examina-
tions of a judicial candidate, see Powe, The Senate and the Court: Questioning a Nominee
(Book Review), 54 TEX. L. REV. 891 (1976).
41. Former Professors Bork, Bowman, Easterbrook, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Miner, Noonan,
Posner, Ripple, Scalia, Tacha, Winter, Williams, and Wilkinson are examples.
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evaluate all competing candidates before the nomination.42 Prior to this pe-
riod, Professor Herman Schwartz related that the ABA was perceived as
having an establishment or otherwise unrepresentative cast, making its influ-
ence only haphazard.43 The Reagan administration marginally de-empha-
sized the role of the ABA by submitting to the ABA only the names of
candidates who cleared the internal process.
The ABA role presently remains in a state of flux. After some prodding,
the ABA has sought to quiet criticism by publicly reaffirming earlier guide-
lines that indicate that it will not investigate or report on political or ideolog-
ical matters." While ideology is fair game for the political branches of
government, it is wiser for the multi-partisan membership of the ABA to
avoid this thicket.
Beyond this, a good part of the wariness over the ABA's role stems from
its resistance to making its judicial screening deliberations public.45 Pres-
ently, the ABA makes its investigative report available only to the Attorney
General. Moreover, this report does not specify either the sources or the
entire basis for particular comments evaluating a candidate. The ABA
makes public its final rating only if the President nominates the individual.
ABA representatives, however, will publicly testify about a rating's signifi-
cance or meaning before the Senate Judiciary Committee.46
Liberal and conservative public interest organizations, seeking to apply
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)47 to the ABA's judicial
screening process, recently challenged the secrecy surrounding the ABA
procedure.4 FACA requires, among other things, advance public notice
and open meetings by advisory committees chaired or attended by an officer
of the Federal Government. 49 For these reasons, the ABA resisted the ap-
plication of FACA to its judicial screening work from the statute's incep-
42. H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61.
43. Id.
44. ABA To Avoid Politics, Ideology in Screening, Wash. Times, May 3, 1989, at A4, cols.
2-5. Although the ABA insisted that it did not review candidates based on ideology, it stated
in an ABA publication: " '[P]olitical and ideological philosophy are not considered, except to
the extent they may bear upon other factors .... ABA to Resume Its Evaluations for Judge
Posts, Wall St. J., June 5, 1989, at B7, col. 3.
45. ABA STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIARY, WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 9-
10 (1988).
46. See Judging the Bar's Judicial Screening, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1989, at A25, col. 3. See
also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2561 & n.3 (1989); Segal,
Federal Judicial Selection - Progress and the Promise of the Future, 46 MASS. L.Q. 138
(1961).
47. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988).
48. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
49. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(2)-(3), (e).
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tion. Recently, in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 50 the
United States Supreme Court sanctioned the ABA's position. Straining to
disregard the plain text of FACA, the Court permitted the ABA to keep its
deliberations confidential. 1
On its face, FACA applies to any advisory committee, whether or not
created or funded by the government, that is "utilized" by the President or
one of the agencies. 2 Calling "utilized" a "woolly verb,"53. the Court in
Public Citizen manufactured a distinction between the "provision of advice,"
which the ABA undeniably did, and "utilization" of it, which the Court said
must be understood not by its dictionary definition, but in terms of Con-
gress' purposes.54 Disregarding the purposes articulated in the statute's ac-
companying Conference Report,55 which fit the ABA committee remarkably
well, the Court narrowly interpreted Congress' purpose as merely avoiding
wasteful expenditures and biased advice by a multiplicity of advisors, rather
than liberally opening the federal advisory process to public scrutiny. 6 At-
tempting to bolster this non-textual reading of the statute, the Court drew
upon other isolated fragments of FACA's expansive legislative history. In
addition, according to the majority, executive practices contemporaneous
with the passage of FACA indicated that neither the Kennedy nor the John-
son administrations apparently ever thought FACA applied to the ABA ju-
dicial screening committee. 7
Three members of the Court concurred in the majority's judgment that
FACA could not require the ABA to open its proceedings, but strenuously
disputed the Court's method of statutory interpretation. Instead, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, found that the
application of FACA to the President's nomination authority was contrary
50. 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
51. Id. at 2564-73.
52. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(B), (C).
53. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2565.
54. Id. at 2567-72.
55. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1403, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1972).
56. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2565, 2571-72. The Senate Report urged that the statute
be understood in its "most liberal sense, so that when an officer brings together a group by
formal or informal means, by contract or other arrangement, and whether or not Federal
money is expended, to obtain advice and information, such group is covered by the provisions
of this bill." S. REP. No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972).
57. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2568. However, the Court found it difficult to not give
deference to the General Service Administration regulations. These regulations clearly
demonstrated that the ABA was a "preferred source" of advice insofar as its advice was regu-
larly sought and accorded greater weight than that of others. Id. at 2571 n. 12. See also Fed-
eral Property Management Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1003 (1988).
58. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2573-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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to the President's Article II authority.5 9 Admitting the general principle
that a court must seek a statutory construction whenever feasible to avoid a
constitutional question,' the concurrence stated that "this principle cannot
be stretched beyond the point at which such a construction remains !fairly
possible.' ",61 Here, the concurrence concluded that the constitutional ques-
tion could be avoided only by "the unhealthy process of amending the stat-
ute by judicial interpretation."6 2 Finding that in the constitutional text, the
President explicitly and exclusively possesses the power to nominate, the
concurrence stated that no intrusion by the legislative branch was tolera-
ble.63 FACA, according to the concurrence, constituted a "direct and real
interference" with the President's responsibilities.'
Despite the severe infirmity of the majority's reasoning, for purposes of
this Article, the Court's opinion settled the question of whether the public
could utilize FACA, in a woolly or polyester fashion, to pry the lid off the
ABA's screening process. Perhaps in the background of both the majority
and the concurring opinions laid concern for the ability of the President to
obtain honest advice in a public forum. In this respect, the Court's opinion
is consistent with President Jefferson's observations to Secretary of the
Treasury Gallatin that:
Recommendations when honestly written should detail the bad as
well as the good qualities of the person recommended. That gen-
tlemen may do freely if they know their letter is to be confined to
the president or the head of a department. But if communicated
further it may bring on them troublesome quarrels. In G1. Wash-
ington's time he resisted every effort to bring forth his
recommendations.65
Even though its pre-screening influence may have decreased slightly dur-
ing the Reagan years, the ABA's ability to label a candidate as "not quali-
fied" clearly continued to place constraints on the selection process. While
President Carter and other presidents nominated several candidates so la-
59. Id. at 2581. Justice Scalia did not participate. As Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel in 1973-74, Justice Scalia previously considered the question, reaching
a result similar to that of the Kennedy concurrence. See Memorandum for the Federal Appel-
lee at 5 n.3, Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989) (Nos. 88-
494; 88-429).
60. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
61. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2580 (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
62. Id. at 2578.
63. Id. at 2581.
64. Id. at 2584.




beled, President Reagan did not. In addition, the ABA's screening process
may have slowed the Reagan trend toward selecting academics, because the
ABA appeared to accord greater weight to practice experience and yielded
an unexpectedly low "qualified" rating for some of those going from the
classroom to the courtroom.6 6
III. THE QUESTIONS ASKED AND ANSWERED: NOMINEE INQUIRY
DURING THE REAGAN ERA
Because both the President and the Senate have broad authority to inquire
into the background, fitness, and philosophy of nominees, it is worthwhile to
examine how this power was exercised during the Reagan years. As noted
earlier, the President's criteria were manifest in the Republican Party plat-
form .67 Nevertheless, the administration engaged in some unnecessary de-
nial that these criteria amounted to ideological screening. 68 The President, it
was asserted, was more interested in having judicial candidates with a
"'proper" conception of the judicial role than candidates who could be easily
identified as liberal or conservative. 69 Although this may be true, the plat-
form statement revealed that the administration was also interested in judges
who favored certain outcomes, such as greater deference to state law, tradi-
tional family values, and the protection of innocent life. Throughout the
Reagan era, giving more precise content to these statements in the political
platform in light of existing court precedent tested the administration's com-
mitment to another principle it held dear: judicial restraint as a neutral
principle.
The tension between desired conservative ends and judicial methodology,
however, was not always problematic. In application to contemporary cir-
cumstances, there is often a striking confluence of conservative outcomes
and the methods employed by a restrained judge.7 ° This fact was well-ap-
preciated, if not always explicitly acknowledged, by the President's judicial
selection team. For example, one administration report, which portrayed as
"myth" the notion that the President selected judges on the basis of political
66. MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 4, at 4.
67. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
68. MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 4, at 5.
69. Id. at 5-6.
70. Some conservatives were not reticent about noting the relationship between judicial
restraint and conservative ends. See Stern, Judging the Judges: The First Two Years of the
Reagan Bench, 1 BENCHMARK, July-Oct. 1984, at 3.
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ideology, later stated with satisfaction that a study found Reagan judges
tougher on crime than 'both Carter and Nixon judges.7
Certainly, opponents of President Reagan's nominees believed that their
philosophical and political interests would suffer under Reagan judges
adopting a restrained decisionmaking posture. But the opposition, too, in-
sisted on speaking in code. Instead of judicial restraint, the opposition's en-
coded formulation focused on whether a nominee occupied the
"mainstream" of legal thought.72 Not surprisingly, opponents claimed that
a fair number of the legal positions important to the President could not be
located in the mainstream.73 Like actual streams, the "mainstream" also
tended to shift, making it difficult for some Reagan nominees to locate, let
alone navigate, it successfully.74
At the risk of cartographical error, the so-called mainstream, for at least
some of the President's political opposition, flowed at various times through
71. MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 4, at 5-7 (citing Rowland, Songer & Carp, Presi-
dential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges 22
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 191 (1988)).
Because the President had every right to inquire into judicial philosophy, and because many
Americans shared President Reagan's concern with judicial decisions that frustrate legitimate
law enforcement efforts, it was unclear why the administration disguised these policy concerns.
If anything, the reluctance to candidly acknowledge that both policy and judicial methodology
guided Reagan judicial selection might have unintentionally weakened, rather than enhanced,
the intellectual claim that a posture of judicial restraint could be wholly neutral.
72. See generally Biden, Choosing Judges, 8 NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 13 (arguing that
the Constitution requires that the President select nominees from the "mainstream of Ameri-
can jurisprudence").
73. In the Bork nomination, Senator Biden, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, authorized preparation of a formal response to the White House analysis of Judge
Bork's record. In this unpublished, but widely circulated, document dated Sept. 2, 1987, it is
clear that those who found Judge Bork outside the "mainstream" of legal thought viewed
Judge Bork as implementing the President's legal philosophy. U. S. SENATE, COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, RESPONSE PREPARED To WHITE HOUSE ANALYSIS OF JUDGE BORK'S RECORD
13 (Sept. 2, 1987). For example, the response document states:
From the outset of his Administration, Reagan has made clear his desire to fill the
Judiciary with people who decide cases as he would. Though the President's term
will end in 18 months, the nomination of Bork gives Reagan the opportunity to write
his views into the law for years to come.
Id.
74. This seemed most evident in the consideration of Professor Bernard Siegan for an
appellate court vacancy. Of the nominations rejected, Professor Siegan's was probably the
least well-considered. A genial, scholarly man, appointed to serve with former Chief Justice
Burger on the Bicentennial Commission, Professor Siegan had the misfortune of being virtu-
ally last in line. Following the Bork and Ginsburg experiences, enough bad blood flowed be-
tween the political branches to sink almost any nominee. The Siegan nomination thus tended
to confirm that a nominee's chances varied directly with the remaining tenure of the nominat-
ing President. See Segal & Spaeth, If a Supreme Court Vacancy Occurs, Will the Senate Con-
firm a Reagan Nominee?, 69 JUDICATURE 186-90 (1986).
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the incorporation doctrine, especially as it pertained to the expansion of
rights afforded criminal defendants. The mainstream's course also engulfed
the right to privacy, including the abortion right (although perhaps for stra-
tegic reasons, privacy was most often discussed outside the divisive abortion
context), and a fairly expansive view of equal protection, including, at times,
sexual preference and nonremedial affirmative action." Given that aspects
of each of these issues continue to dominate the Supreme Court's calendar,
one cannot credibly claim that a particular view of any of these subjects is
definitively correct.76 To be fair, a few serious scholars, who often find
themselves in opposition to the President, acknowledge that with respect to
each subject a "wide range" of constitutional opinion exists and that "a phi-
losophy must be more than a bumper sticker.""
Unfortunately, many op-eds, editorials, advertisements, and position pa-
pers appearing contemporaneously with the hearings showed much less rec-
ognition of these subtleties. On the conservative side, the meaning of judicial
restraint was more or less assumed rather than discussed. Yet, the applica-
tion and meaning of the principle is not always self-evident. For example,
consider the application of judicial restraint to the otherwise uncontroversial
apportionment clause of the fourteenth amendment. The amendment pro-
vides: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States ac-
cording to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed."' 78 What does judicial restraint
mean for the counting of illegal aliens? How would a "restrained" nominee
arrive at a decision? The amendment's text suggests use of the broadest pos-
sible term, that is, persons, not citizens, but the purpose of the clause ap-
pears largely to affect the political interests of citizens. As for legislative
history, the concept of "illegal alien" did not exist when the 39th Congress
proposed the fourteenth amendment. Yet, the Census Bureau has always
counted illegal aliens.7 9 Does it matter that the Supreme Court has included
illegal aliens within the definition of "person" for purposes of the equal pro-
75. See generally H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 169-70, app. I (by negative implication).
76. Professor Stephen Carter observed: "[C]ritics insisted that Judge Bork's constitu-
tional theory was outside the mainstream of contemporary jurisprudence, but unless the main-
stream is defined very narrowly, this charge is surely incorrect as a factual matter." Carter,
supra note 19, at 1191.
77. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 97.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
79. The United States has, since 1790, followed a consistent practice of counting all aliens
for purposes of apportionment. In this respect, the first census act directed that "every person
whose usual place of abode shall be in any family [on census day] shall be returned as of such
family." Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 101, 103. This section remained unchanged in
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tection clause,8" or is that a wholly separate analytical exercise even though
contained in the same amendment?
The opposition similarly tended to paint too broadly, as its focus on
roughly characterized outcomes, rather than legal reasoning, suggested.
During the Bork hearings, for example, the discussion of the right to privacy
focused on whether privacy was good or bad.81 However, Judge Bork ques-
tioned the origin of the right, not its wisdom. Similar questions had been
raised by a wide range of scholars from Archibald Cox to Philip Kurland. 2
This scholarly concern with constitutional theory, and ultimately demo-
cratic legitimacy, seemed often lost on popular critics, and even some sena-
tors and witnesses.8 3
Perhaps the worst example of this outcome fixation was the circulation by
a number of organizations of simple-minded statistical evidence purportedly
subsequent censuses and has been the standard test for the census ever since. See, e.g., Act of
1810, § 5, 3 Stat. 548, 552; Act of Mar. 23, 1830, § 5, 4 Stat. 383, 386.
Although Congress contemplated excluding aliens following the passage of the fourteenth
amendment, it rejected the proposition expressing constitutional concerns. For example, both
the Seventy-first and Seventy-second Congresses considered such exclusion, but the Senate
Legal Counsel issued an opinion in 1929 which concluded that, after a review of both the
fourteenth amendment and the Constitution, the fourteenth amendment did not exclude aliens.
This issue was re-examined during the period that the author headed the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, and the author reached a similar conclusion against exclusion. Subsequently, the United
States defended the practice of counting illegal aliens for apportionment purposes in Ridge v.
Verity, 715 F. Supp. 1308 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (entering summary judgment for the United States
on standing grounds, the court rejected claims of standing by individual members of Congress
suing in their individual capacity as well as the separate standing claims of states and
organizations).
80. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) (holding that the fourteenth amend-
ment guarantee of equal protection applies to illegal aliens).
81. See, e.g., Nomination of Robert Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. 116-17,
150-51, 183, 240-42, 385 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings].
82. See Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 25 (1978); A. Cox, THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1976) (discussing privacy and
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
83. Professor Stephen Carter makes a similar point by drawing out the confusion during
the Bork hearings between privacy rights that have a judicial basis and rights that have a
constitutional basis. Thus, with some obvious cynicism, he wrote that "[w]hen the people and
their representatives talk of 'protecting our basic rights,' or even 'maintaining the essential
balance,' it is hard to imagine that they mean much more than 'making sure we still have the
votes.' " Carter, supra note 19, at 1191. However, if Professor Carter correctly asserts that
our fundamental rights are perceived as wholly dependent upon the shifting majorities of the
Supreme Court, then his statement demonstrates why it is necessary for both the President and
the Senate to pursue more forthrightly the type of jurisprudential inquiry outlined later in this
Article. See infra notes 93-134 and accompanying text.
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showing that Judge Bork was "pro-business" or "anti-criminal defendant."84
Such nose counting produced tremendous distortion. As Professor Paul
Freund wrote forty years ago:
A case may present, in one aspect, an issue of civil liberties; it may
also involve issues of federalism, or of the relation of the Court to
the legislature, or of the standing of the litigant to invoke judicial
redress at all.
A topical catalog of decisions or of votes of individual Justices is
likely perforce to focus on the winning and losing litigants and the
social interests with which they are identified: big business, tax-
payers, labor, political or religious minorities, and so on. To rely
on any such scheme of analysis is a dubious approach to an under-
standing of the Supreme Court.8 5
The result-oriented criticism of President Reagan's nominees may have
also misled the public in ways that should generate considerable concern.
Any suggestion that judicial candidates are evaluated on the basis of whether
popular policies are advanced or favored litigants are advantaged cannot be
reconciled with the concept of "equal justice under law." Few laymen are
familiar with the first line of the judicial oath to "administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich .... 86
Even fewer laymen will long believe these words if prominent lawyers or
public officials in a judicial nomination proceeding not only fail to repudiate
the notion of such partiality, but also tolerate, or worse, propagate it.
The contest between judicial restraint and the "mainstream" was also por-
trayed as one of adherence to original intent versus noninterpretativism.
This line of inquiry similarly tended to be unenlightening. Despite lengthy
symposia,87 the meaning of original intent in a great many contexts still re-
mains unclear. A few make a mockery of the concept by suggesting that it
"would keep the Constitution in a powdered wig and knee breeches... [and]
would lock us into the moral vision and limited experience of people centu-
ries ago.",88 To my knowledge, no serious advocate of the concept has ever
made this suggestion. Rather, the proposition is simply that judges must
make constitutional decisions by starting with the text, drafting, and ratifica-
84. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP, "THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF JUDGE
ROBERT H. BORK" (1987), reprinted in Bork Hearings, supra note 81, at 1725 (1987). For
similar "analysis" dressed in "academic" garb, see Note, All the President's Men? A Study of
Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1987).
85. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 3-4 (1949).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1982).
87. See, e.g., THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITrEN CONSTITUTION
(Federalist Soc'y ed. 1986).
88. See H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 34.
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tion history of the Constitution, ascertaining the relevant principles there-
from, and applying those principles to the contemporary circumstances
presented by a specific case. 9 Stated this way, there is far less disagreement
with original intent as a method of interpretation. The more severe disagree-
ments come, of course, in application. As one observer stated:
The text of the Constitution, as anyone experienced with words
might expect, is least precise where it is most important. Like the
Ten Commandments, the Constitution enshrines profound values
but necessarily omits the minor premises required to apply them
.... History can be of considerable help, but it tells us much too
little about the specific.., intentions, and no one foresaw, or could
have foreseen, the disputes that changing social conditions and
outlooks would bring before the Court.9"
Certainly, some would be astonished to know that Robert Bork made this
observation twenty-one years ago. The observation was just as true at his
confirmation hearing, and in that lies a serious academic shortcoming.
While there is a considerable body of constitutional legal history to inform
the attempts at defining the opaque terms of the Constitution, few constitu-
tional scholars have undertaken the difficult task of assembling the material
into useful form for the profession and the courts.9 1 Consequently, law stu-
dents are taught cases and little else. If the cases got it "wrong," it is foolish
to expect the hurried practitioner or overburdened judge to undertake origi-
nal scholarship. Today, it is a rare case for even the Supreme Court to rely
on anything more than its own precedent.92
89. An important question for all adherents to the original understanding is at what level
of generality should courts interpret constitutional provisions. In this regard, Professors Far-
ber and Sherry write: "Does the Eighth Amendment require judges to apply some general
concept of 'cruel and unusual'? Or does it address only what specific punishments the framers
meant to forbid?" D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
383 (1989). Robert Bork answers that "the problem of levels of generality may be solved by
choosing no level of generality higher than that which interpretation of the words, structure,
and history of the Constitution fairly support." Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 828 (1986).
90. Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 138, 141.
91. For a very helpful collection of historical insights into original meaning, see D. FAR-
BER & S. SHERRY, supra note 89. Professors Farber and Sherry relate that despite the re-
awakened interest in originalism, even as fostered by the Constitution's bicentennial, they were
"shocked to discover" that very little of the original history of the Constitution was readily
available. Id. at xiii.
92. The Court has sometimes dismissed, perhaps too easily, the original meaning, finding
that it was forgotten in the " ' crucible of litigation.' " See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
106-07 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 52 (Stevens, J.)).
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IV. JUDICIAL SELECTION THROUGH A JURISPRUDENTIAL LENS
Not far beneath the surface of the mainstream lie some questions of
greater moment. These go beyond superficial inquiries concerning judicial
restraint versus activism. Looking through a jurisprudential lens, the de-
fense or attack of original meaning can be seen as raising longstanding ques-
tions pertaining to the unsettled relationship between law and morality and
the obligation to obey the law.
In an absolute form, the search for original intent in the law as written or
promulgated seemingly denies the necessity for a relationship between law
and morality in order for the law to have obligatory force. In this sense, one
may truly characterize original intent as an affirmation of the positivist
school of jurisprudence. Positivism concentrates on the law as formally en-
acted. Scholars have justified positivism over time in a number of ways. For
example, over a century ago, John Austin located the obligation to obey the
law in the State's coercive power to apply sanctions.93 People obey laws not
as a result of moral inquiry but out of a desire to avoid the coercive sanction
of the State, whether loss of life, liberty or fine.94 On the irrelevance of
morality to the assay of law's validity, Austin emphatically wrote:
The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most op-
posed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as
laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively
beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of
death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I
object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God .... the
Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my rea-
soning by hanging me up, in pursuance of the law of which I have
impugned the validity. An exception, demurrer, or plea, founded
on the law of God was never heard in a Court of Justice, from the
creation of the world down to the present moment.9 5
In this century, H.L.A. Hart found assertion to be the answer to the ques-
tion of why the law is obeyed: namely, that those are the established rules of
the political system.96 One law professor has characterized Hart's thesis:
"[T]he answer under Hart's model to the question 'why am I obligated to
drive under 65 mph' is just like the answer to the question 'why am I "obli-
gated" (when playing chess) to move my bishop diagonally'? 997
93. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (Library of Ideas ed. 1954).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 185.
96. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
97. Soper, Making Sense of Modern Jurisprudence: The Paradox of Positivism and the
Challenge for Natural Law, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 67, 78-79 (1989).
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Yet, Hart was more equivocal than Austin in the face of moral claim. The
immoral law was still valid, but it did not "'supplant morality.' "98 Hart's
equivocation, however, is baffling. Did it mean to say there was a legal obli-
gation to obey the law, but not a moral one? Hart largely leaves unanswered
the fact that from the time of the ancients the good citizen has been likened
to the law-abiding citizen.99 Hart attempted to bridge this gap by asserting
that certain "natural facts" exist which are common to both law and moral-
ity.1° This "minimum content of natural law" is a necessary predicate to
law because, in its absence, "men, as they are, would have no reason for
obeying voluntarily any rules; and without a minimum of co-operation given
voluntarily by those who find that it is in their interest to submit to and
maintain the rules, coercion of others who would not voluntarily conform
would be impossible."' 0' 1 In making this claim, Hart wandered a significant
distance from Austin and the positivist fold.
By comparison, Hans Kelsen's positivism draws the theory closer to the
philosophy directly undergirding original intent. 112 Law was to be obeyed,
not because it was necessarily just, but because it coincided with first princi-
ples - represented by the Constitution and the enactments (or norms) of the
legislature. 0 3 Consequently, Kelsen argued: "[T]he basic norm of a legal
order prescribes that one ought to behave as the 'fathers' of the constitution
and the individuals - directly or indirectly - authorized (delegated) by the
constitution[al] command.''"
These positivist notions cannot be dismissed lightly. At least as implied
by Kelsen, and later refined by Jefferson into the "consent of the gov-
98. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615-
20 (1958).
99. Consider, for example, the trial of Socrates as recounted by Plato, and Socrates' deci-
sion to abide by the law rather than flee imprisonment and death. PLATO, "CRITO," THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO (B. Jowett trans. & J. Kaplan ed. 1950). Plato, however, observed that
Socrates' compliance followed only his failure to convince Athens that her laws were unjust.
Failing in this regard, Socrates posited that under the laws, if he disregarded the law, he would
be "doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning [his] back upon the
compacts and agreements which [he] made as a citizen." Id. at 59.
100. H. HART, supra note 96, at 189-95.
101. Id. at 189, 190-95. According to Hart, the minimum content consisted of "forbear-
ances." For example, the avoidance of killing or the infliction of bodily harm; the acknowledg-
ment of approximate equality, such that without cooperation no one person could dominate
another for more than a short time; limited altruism as proof that men are neither angels nor
devils; the recognition of some concept of property as a means of husbanding limited resources;
and the acceptance of need for some coercive system of rules in light of the limited understand-
ing of man to perceive his long-term interest or avoid weakness of will. Id. at 189-95.
102. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1945).




erned,"105 they bolster democratic principles. More specifically, as related
to judicial selection, they suggest that the personal values of the positivist
judicial candidate can be largely put to one side, because regardless of per-
sonal belief, the law will be applied impartially.1 16 It does not matter
whether the positivist judicial candidate or judge believes that Oliver North
was a hero or a scoundrel, because the only relevant question for him will be
whether the law prohibits lying to Congress and whether Mr. North lied. 107
The positivist judge may sympathize with those in a religious order, who
harbor illegal aliens seeking sanctuary from oppression in Central America,
but the judge will find nonetheless a conspiracy to violate the immigration
laws. Again, Kelsen wrote:
Just as the actual behavior of the individuals may or may not cor-
respond to the norms of positive law regulating this behavior, posi-
tive law may or may not correspond to an ideal law presented as
justice or 'natural' law .... [Positive laws's] existence is independ-
ent of its conformity or nonconformity with justice or 'natural'
law. 108
Thus, for the positivist, the validity of the law is dependent not upon its
compatibility with morality, but "by virtue of the fact that it has been cre-
ated according to a definite rule and by virtue thereof only.""0 9
Despite these arguments, there is considerable discomfort with positivism.
At the theoretical level, Lon Fuller took direct issue with Hart's claim that
the proper end of human activity was mere survival."10 For Fuller, the sub-
stantive content, the core element, of natural law was the imposition of a
105. See generally JURISPRUDENCE UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 403 (W. Reis-
man & A. Schreiber eds. 1987) (comparing Kelsen's conception of origin of authority and
origin of law with earlier writers).
106. Senator Biden, similarly, observed during the hearings for Abner Mikva:
I frankly do not know how we could approve any Members of the U.S. Senate, U.S.
Congress, a member of any legislative body, or anyone who ever served in a policy
decision, who has taken a position on any issue, if the rationale for disqualifying you
is that you have taken strong positions. That is certainly not proof of your inability
to be objective and avoid being a policymaker on the bench.
The Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings on the Nomination of Abner
Mikva Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 396
(1980).
107. Of course, North was tried before a jury, and ample evidence suggests that his jurors
may have tempered the law with their own collective sense of fairness. One juror observed:
"Being a veteran myself, you know, I wouldn't want to down another veteran .... Col.
North, well, maybe I don't know whether he's all that bad or all that good .... He was guilty
but I don't think he should go to jail for it." Ex-NSC Aid is Acquitted on 9 Charges, Wash.
Post, May 5, 1989, at Al, col. 5 (statement of juror Earl F. Williams).
108. H. KELSEN, supra note 102, at xiv.
109. Id. at 113.
110. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 184-85 (1969).
19891
Catholic University Law Review
"morality of duty" that, through communication, would make it unneces-
sary to live in "hideous misery.""' Apart from such abstraction, the argu-
ment coming from natural law becomes simply, though hauntingly, that
separating law from moral inquiry inevitably results in injustice in specific
cases.
The prospect for such injustice genuinely troubled the Senate committee
with reference to Judge Bork's privacy views. How could Judge Bork pro-
vide assurance that he would protect privacy in a just manner if he was
willing to allow states to legislate in ways that did not conform with privacy
values? But whose privacy values? The values of the legal realist protecting
the privacy and sanctity of liberty of contract? The values of the critical
legal studies disciple promoting the reallocation of social power in whatever
form? The values of Aristotle advancing proportionality, rectification, and
equality?.1 . The less agreement over the applicable set of normative val-
ues,"' 3 the more likely, that the positivist will seek refuge in the concept of
"the law is the law."''
1 14
111. Id. Here, Fuller is referring to Hart's claim that "an overwhelming majority of men
do wish to live even at the cost of hideous misery." Id. (quoting H. HART, supra note 96, at
189-95).
112. ARISTOTLE 209-15 (W. Ross 3d ed. 1937).
113. This difficulty, of course, cannot be finessed by uncritical reference to the natural law
or natural rights. In this respect, a longstanding complaint about the reliance upon natural
law, perhaps dating back to Aristotle's use of the term "nature" in the Nichomachean Ethics, is
its indeterminacy. Justice Holmes once commented: "The jurists who believe in natural law
seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted
by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere."
Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918). But see Rice, Some Reasons For A
Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539 (1989).
114. Even when scholars agree over a given set of normative values or rights, as there exists
with regard to the fundamental rights captured in the Bill of Rights, there can be substantial
disagreement over what these rights contain and to whom they apply. Several features of the
Constitution, including its indefinite language and its explicit reference to unenumerated rights
in the ninth amendment, suggest that the Court should construe these rights broadly in the
natural law tradition. See Moore, The Written Constitution and Interpretivism, 12 HARV. J.L.
& Pun. POL'Y 3 (1989). Moore argues that Madison and Hamilton were aware that the natu-
ral law was "not very knowable." Id. at 13.
If you are going to worry about this problem in the context of judicial power, your
main concern should be to get the right judges on the bench, those who know that
liberty exists and know what it means. Those judges are constrained. Of course, the
trick is to figure out who they are. Not a small trick ....
Id. By contrast, the late Justice Hugo Black warned against reliance upon "natural rights"
because they "degrade the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously
appropriate for [the Supreme] Court a broad power which we are not authorized by the Con-




The positivist refuge was not enough to enable Judge Bork to survive Sen-
ate scrutiny. For example, his decision in Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
International Union v. American Cyanamid Co. 115 raised a striking moral
dilemma, and he answered it with the cold text of the statute. The case
concerned a West Virginia chemical plant where the lead concentrations
permitted by law nevertheless presented a health hazard to pregnant female
employees.' 16 The company established a policy whereby fertile women had
a choice: either enter a competition for a handful of lower paying jobs or
provide proof of sterilization." 7 When the union challenged the policy as
violative of the general duty provisions of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act," 8 Judge Bork decided that the policy was not the type of haz-
ard envisioned by the statute or its legislative history." 9 As a good positiv-
ist, Bork conceived of his role as not to resolve what he acknowledged was a
tremendous moral dilemma, but to follow the law as written. He wrote:
As we understand the law, we are not free to make a legislative
judgment. We may not, on the one hand, decide that the company
is innocent because it chose to let the women decide for themselves
which course was less harmful to them. Nor may we decide that
the company is guilty because it offered an option of sterilization
that the women might ultimately regret choosing. These are moral
issues of no small complexity, but they are not for us. Congress
has enacted a statute and our only task is the mundane one of in-
terpreting its language and applying its policy. 120
The explanation did not prove sufficiently availing for confirmation. Sena-
tor Metzenbaum called Bork's decision "inhumane,"' 12 ' and Harvard Law
Professor Kathleen Sullivan said: "He did not see that fundamental liberty
to procreate as demanding a reading of the statute that would have protected
these women."' 12 2 The dissatisfaction with Judge Bork's response illustrated
that an essential point of contention left unresolved by the judicial selection
dialogue during the Reagan years was neither the respective roles of the
President and the Senate, nor the elusive meaning of judicial restraint or
"mainstream" jurisprudence. Instead, it was whether judges were required
to temper the hard, sharp edges of the law with compassion. Again, how-
115. 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
116. Id. at 445.
117. Id. at 445-46.
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
119. American Cyanamid, 741 F.2d at 445, 450.
120. Id. at 445.
121. Bork Hearings, supra note 81, at 468.
122. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, EXEC. REP. No. 100-7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1987).
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ever, the application of compassion requires agreement on the applicable
moral principles, and the Senate committee viewed Judge Bork's views with
suspicion. Thus, the Senate devoted substantial hearing time toward ob-
taining Bork's assurances of fidelity to the precedent he had called into ques-
tion over the length of his career. 12 3
Assume, however, that there is enough agreement over a background set
of moral principles that most people would be offended by a case presenting
the facts of American Cyanamid. This would not seem to be a farfetched
assumption, since both Judge Bork and Senator Metzenbaum identified the
difficult moral dilemma posed by the company's sterilization policy. What
approaches might a judge seeking to dojustice follow? One course may be to
pursue what has been called the "judicial lie.' 124 Indeed, Judge Bork con-
templated this approach in American Cyanamid, but rejected it.125 He
wrote: "There is no doubt that the words of the general duty clause can be
read, albeit with some semantic distortion, to cover the sterilization excep-
tion contained in [the company's] fetus protection policy." '126 Judge Bork,
however, reasoned that this did not represent the "plain meaning" of the
statute. Relying on caselaw construing similar provisions and legislative his-
tory, he found that "[i]t seems to us safer ... to confine the term 'hazards'
under the general duty clause to the types of hazards we know Congress had
in mind;"1 27 namely, "air pollutants, industrial poisons, combustibles and
123. See generally Bork Hearings, supra note 81, at 116-17 (Senator Biden questioning
Judge Bork on the decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); id. at 150-51
(Senator Kennedy questioning Judge Bork on his legal justification for the overruling of state
statute in Griswold); id. at 182-83 (Senator Hatch questioning Judge Bork on the unpredictabil-
ity of the right to privacy); id. at 240-41 (Senator Simpson asking Judge Bork to elaborate on
his beliefs regarding the type of privacy that is protected under the Constitution).
124. Daly, Justice and Judges, B.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 364 (1988). A friendlier commentator
might characterize the approach as merely a liberal or broad statutory interpretation.
125. Justice Brennan recently rejected a similar invitation to the judicial lie in Mallard v.
United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989). In Mallard, Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, found that the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which pro-
vided that " '[t]he court may request an attorney to represent an indigent [person]'" meant
what it said - namely, request rather than require. Id. at 1818. The Court stated: "We
emphasize that our decision today is limited to interpreting § 1915(d). We do not mean to
question, let alone denigrate, lawyers' ethical obligation to assist those who are too poor to
afford counsel .... " Id. at 1822. The Court also did not reach the question of whether the
court has inherent authority to order the attorney to serve. Dissenting, Justice Stevens wrote:
"The relationship between a court and the members of its bar is not defined by statute
alone.... In context, I would therefore construe the word 'request' in § 1915(d) as meaning
'respectfully command.' " Id. at 1823, 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. American Cyanamid, 741 F.2d at 447.
127. Id. at 449.
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explosives, noise, unsafe work practices and inadequate training and the
like."1 28
In the end, it did not turn out "safer" for Judge Bork to adopt this nar-
rower construction; indeed, Senator Metzenbaum's criticism suggests that
Judge Bork should not have been reluctant to give the statute its broadest
construction to protect the economically less advantaged women against the
company. However, had Judge Bork relied upon his moral misgivings,
could he not then be faulted for imposing his unenacted moral beliefs in the
course of his public duties?
Geraldine Ferraro strongly argued against a public official imposing pri-
vate moral beliefs upon the public during the 1984 presidential campaign.
Ferraro made the argument with respect to the dichotomy between her pri-
vate and public views on abortion. Mario Cuomo said something similar,
but less absolute, at the University of Notre Dame by stressing the lack of
consensus on the subject of abortion. 129 In response, Henry Hyde argued
that it was the duty of every public official to act on his moral beliefs to
create the moral consensus. 130 Congressman Hyde's formulation appears
persuasive for those legislators who speak only after direct election and in a
binding way only as a body. The same claim, however, may not be as easily
accepted for executive officers charged with implementing the law as written,
or a fortiori, for federal judges who must interpret the law without ever fac-
ing electoral scrutiny.
If it is more appropriate for a legislator than a judge to champion that the
law be read in light of normative or moral principle, is it also fitting for a
legislator to seek to accomplish this end by questioning a sitting judge about
a prior decision? It is generally agreed that judicial candidates should not be
asked to make commitments about how they would rule in the future.'31
This undermines judicial independence and the separation of powers and
does violence to the impartiality that judges are expected to bring to the
individual facts and circumstances of different cases. Inquiries about prior
decisions raise similar concerns. Moreover, with an existing precedent, a
risk exists that ex post interrogation of the deciding judicial officer may cloud
its meaning. The senior Senator Gore, in questioning Abe Fortas in 1968,
128. Id. (quoting the OSHA Review Commission).
129. See Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective, 1
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13, 20 (1984).
130. Hyde, Keeping God in the Closet: Some Thoughts on the Exorcism of Religious Values
from Public Life, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 33, 48-49 (1984).
131. See Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation Hear-
ings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the
Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. 109 (1987).
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observed that "a judge is under the greatest and most compelling necessity to
avoid construing or explaining opinions of the Court lest he may appear to
be adding to or subtracting from what has been decided, or may perchance
be prejudging future cases." 132 One should not overstate this objection,
however, as past cases reveal a great deal about legal competence and
reasoning.
The "judicial lie," of course, is not the only alternative available to a judge
pursuing the path of justice. Indeed, some of history's most profound philo-
sophical figures from Socrates to Ghandi would presumably urge the judge
to follow the law as written or resign. 133 Thomas More, who was willing to
give benefit of law to the devil, and chastised Roper for his apparent willing-
ness to cut down every law in England to achieve his moral ends, might at
the very least urge the avoidance of direct clashes between law and moral-
ity.134 For this reason, it can reasonably be assumed that Thomas More
would counsel judicial candidates to have a healthy respect for the principle
of stare decisis, not only as a means of bringing stability to the law, but also
as a means of maintaining the social fabric which may be incapable of the
sustained pressure of moral questioning and justification at every turn. In
short, a judge must be prudent about construing broadly Thomas Aquinas'
well-known injunction in the face of an "unjust law." Once a federal judge
signals a willingness to step beyond the bounds of restraint to declare the
unjust enactment to be no law at all, he necessarily challenges his own
source of, at least, temporal authority.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, under a jurisprudential lens, there is more to the examination of
the judicial selection process than meets the political eye. Much time and
effort in the Reagan era was expended to defend the relative prerogatives and
scope of questions permitted to be asked by the President or the Senate. As
indicated, claims that either the President's or the Senate's inquiry is con-
strained by the Constitution proved to be without merit. Similarly, the skir-
mishing under the unilluminating banners of judicial restraint or the
putative "mainstream" of legal thought obscured, rather than enlightened,
the more fundamental jurisprudential dialogue. In a number of different
132. See Nomination of Abe Fortas, of Tennessee, to be Chief Justice of the United States,
and Nomination of Homer Thornberry, of Texas, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
100-01 (1968) (statement of Senator Albert Gore, Sr.).
133. Ghandi, A Plea for the Severest Penalty Upon His Conviction for Sedition, in THE LAW
AS LITERATURE 459, 465 (E. London ed. 1960).
134. R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 65 (1962).
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guises, the dialectic over judicial selection during the Reagan era reveals a
groping for a better understanding of the enigmatic relationship between law
and morality and the source of the duty to obey the law. The age-old tension
between positivism and the less determinate natural law thus persists.

